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The weak Borda effect and plurality–majority disagreement
Author(s) -
Colman Andrew M.
Publication year - 1984
Publication title -
british journal of mathematical and statistical psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.157
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 2044-8317
pISSN - 0007-1102
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8317.1984.tb00807.x
Subject(s) - voting , interpretation (philosophy) , simple (philosophy) , mathematical economics , mathematics , econometrics , computer science , law , epistemology , philosophy , political science , politics , programming language
The weak Borda effect indicates a failure on the part of the plurality voting procedure to satisfy a criterion of reasonableness according to which none of the losers should be preferred to the winner by a majority of the voters. Contrary to the interpretation of a recent critic, it is not claimed that the weak Borda effect necessarily indicates plurality–majority disagreement. To minimize future misunderstanding, formal definitions of the plurality procedure, the weak Borda effect, and plurality–majority disagreement are given, and a simple method is derived for evaluating the exact probability of plurality–majority disagreement in small decision‐making committees.