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Situational cues as moderators of the frame–outcome relationship
Author(s) -
Olekalns Mara
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
british journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.855
H-Index - 98
eISSN - 2044-8309
pISSN - 0144-6665
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1997.tb01127.x
Subject(s) - moderation , psychology , social psychology , situational ethics , negotiation , outcome (game theory) , set (abstract data type) , settlement (finance) , microeconomics , economics , political science , programming language , finance , computer science , law , payment
Two experiments tested how situational cues moderated the frame‐outcome relationship. In Experiment 1 (E1), three moderating variables were examined: pay‐off structure, partner's frame, and instruction set. A fourth moderator variable, no‐settlement alternative, was introduced in Experiment 2 (E2). Results from both experiments showed that when issues were distributive, loss‐framed negotiators were advantaged when partners were gain‐framed; this advantage was increased by cooperative instructions. When issues were integrative, loss‐framed negotiator behaviour was stable across experiments. Their performance was markedly worse under highly contentious conditions: when individualistic instructions combined with either a loss‐framed partner (E1) or a high no‐settlement alternative (E2). Gain‐framed negotiator performance was more variable. Cooperative conditions (gain‐framed partner, cooperative instructions) resulted in poor outcomes in E1; similar conditions (cooperative instructions, low no‐settlement alternative) led to high outcomes in E2. Across all conditions, some of the variation in outcomes could be attributed to differences in concession rates; additional variation was attributed to differences in expectations about a fair outcome.