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Faking moral judgement on the Defining Issues Test
Author(s) -
Barnett Robert,
Evens Jean,
Rest James
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
british journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.855
H-Index - 98
eISSN - 2044-8309
pISSN - 0144-6665
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1995.tb01063.x
Subject(s) - judgement , psychology , perspective (graphical) , defining issues test , test (biology) , social psychology , cognition , moral reasoning , interpretation (philosophy) , epistemology , philosophy , paleontology , linguistics , artificial intelligence , neuroscience , computer science , biology
In research by Emler, Renwick & Malone (1983), elevated moral judgement scores obtained under altered test conditions were interpreted as evidence that moral reasoning and political attitudes are essentially the same and that self‐presentational strategies explain many differences in moral judgement that have previously been attributed to cognitive development. In the present study, politically liberal, moderate and conservative subjects completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral judgement, once from their own perspective and once from the perspective of a liberal/radical. The DIT was modified to include additional anti‐establishment (A) items. Results indicated that subjects responding from the liberal/radical perspective strongly endorsed A items, and consequently decreased their principled moral judgement scores below their normal levels. Such findings contradict the conclusions of Emler et al. and offer an interpretation less antagonistic to cognitive developmental points of view.