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Moral justification of acts judged to be morally right and acts judged to be morally wrong
Author(s) -
Nisan Mordecai,
Koriat Asher
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
british journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.855
H-Index - 98
eISSN - 2044-8309
pISSN - 0144-6665
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1989.tb00863.x
Subject(s) - moral reasoning , lawrence kohlberg's stages of moral development , psychology , moral disengagement , action (physics) , social cognitive theory of morality , social psychology , moral development , social intuitionism , moral psychology , moral authority , moral dilemma , dilemma , epistemology , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics
In Kohlberg's approach the person's stage of moral development is inferred from the quality of the justifications offered for a moral choice regardless of which course of action is judged as the morally correct. This may imply that moral choice is independent of level of moral reasoning. The study under report suggests otherwise. When subjects offered justifications for alternative courses of action in a moral dilemma, these justifications were of a higher level of moral reasoning when the act was in accord with the subject's own choice than when it was not. This was obtained despite the fact that moral choice and moral reasoning appeared to be independent across individuals. This finding suggests that although moral choices may not evidence a developmental ordering similar to that found for moral reasoning, these choices are probably ranked for each individual in terms of the level of moral reasoning that can be marshalled in their support, and this ordering affects moral decision.