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A critical comparison of bargaining theory and the weighted probability model of coalition behaviour
Author(s) -
Nail Paul R.,
Cole Steven G.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
british journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.855
H-Index - 98
eISSN - 2044-8309
pISSN - 0144-6665
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1985.tb00689.x
Subject(s) - economics , aggregate (composite) , econometrics , test (biology) , mathematical economics , microeconomics , psychology , biology , paleontology , materials science , composite material
Two theories of coalition behaviour, bargaining theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) and the weighted probability model (Komorita, 1974), were tested utilizing data from a single trial of bargaining. It is proposed that previous studies did not adequately compare the two theories either because they employed aggregate data which masked information relevant to bargaining theory, or because they utilized coalition games which did not provide a sensitive test of the weighted probability model. For coalition preferences and coalitions formed, bargaining theory was superior. Pay‐off division was not predicted well by either theory, although bargaining theory did seem to be based on the proper assumptions about the process involved. In spite of the overall predictive superiority of bargaining theory, anecdotal evidence supported one of the primary assumptions of the weighted probability model—that subjects prefer two‐way coalitions over three‐way coalitions because they are easier to form. It is concluded that a complete picture of coalition behaviour will probably be facilitated by assumptions from both theories.