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Coalition behaviour: Effects of coalition values and monetary stakes
Author(s) -
Miller Charles E.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
british journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.855
H-Index - 98
eISSN - 2044-8309
pISSN - 0144-6665
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1985.tb00688.x
Subject(s) - apex (geometry) , economics , value (mathematics) , psychology , social psychology , mathematics , statistics , geometry
Previous studies of coalition behaviour have failed to find any significant effects of monetary stakes. The study described here proposes a possible explanation for these previous failures and tests this explanation, along with the equal excess model of coalition formation, which makes specific predictions regarding the effects of stakes. Each of 288 four‐person groups played one of two apex games, for either high ($30) or low ($3) monetary stakes. The two games were alike in that the pay‐offs (values) per member were greater in the apex (AB, AC, AD) coalitions than the base (BCD) coalition, and the value of the AB coalition was greater than the values of the other apex coalitions. The games differed in that, compared to the AB coalition, the values of the other apex coalitions were greater in Game 1 than Game 2. Player A thus had better alternatives to the AB coalition in Game 1 than Game 2. As predicted by the equal excess model, in Game 1 the apex player (A) received a larger share of the pay‐off in the AB coalition—but the AB coalition formed less frequently—under high stakes than under low stakes. Contrary to the predictions of the equal excess model, however, monetary stakes had no effect on coalition behaviour in Game 2. The findings suggest that the failure of previous studies to find significant effects for monetary stakes has probably been due to their use of weak stakes manipulations and/or their use of games such as Game 2, in which one of the coalitions has a value per member that is relatively large.