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Effects of first impressions and reliability of promises on trust and cooperation
Author(s) -
QuigleyFernandez Barbara,
Malkis Farrell S.,
Tedeschi James T.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
british journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.855
H-Index - 98
eISSN - 2044-8309
pISSN - 0144-6665
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1985.tb00657.x
Subject(s) - psychology , social psychology , dilemma , reliability (semiconductor) , impression formation , social perception , perception , philosophy , power (physics) , physics , epistemology , quantum mechanics , neuroscience
In an experiment utilizing a message‐modified Prisoner's Dilemma game the first impressions of a source of non‐contingent promises were manipulated to be either good‐impotent or bad‐potent. The source was either 100 or 0 per cent reliable in fulfilling his promises and the instructions were either individualistic or competitive. The results showed that initial trust by subjects was affected by both first impressions and the source's reliability. However, subjects displayed the most overall trust when they perceived the promiser as good and impotent. On non‐message trials subjects were more cooperative when a good‐impotent impression conflicted with competitive instructions.