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Remembering intention as a distinct form of memory
Author(s) -
Kvavilashvili Lia
Publication year - 1987
Publication title -
british journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.536
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 2044-8295
pISSN - 0007-1269
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1987.tb02265.x
Subject(s) - psychology , perseveration , forgetting , memorization , cognitive psychology , action (physics) , character (mathematics) , phenomenon , artificiality , social psychology , cognition , epistemology , philosophy , physics , geometry , mathematics , quantum mechanics , neuroscience
This paper deals with a little explored phenomenon – remembering and forgetting intentions. Unlike the usual forms of memory, such as remembering and recalling particular contents and images acquired in the past, it refers to the timely execution of a formerly intended action. In order to test whether these two forms of memory depend on each other or not, an experimental method has been elaborated which makes it possible to avoid the artificiality of experimental instruction and to register simultaneously both remembering intention and remembering a particular content connected with this intention. The lack of correlation between these two variables in Expt 1 indicates that they may be presumably considered as two separate forms of memory. In Expt 2, the role of such factors affecting remembering intention as the importance of intention and the character of the intervening period has been established. The application of multidimensional information analysis showed that there ought to be a certain interaction between these factors. The role of perseveration (i.e. involuntary rehearsal of intention in mind) has also been ascertained. In relation to this, it was found that the importance of intention directly affects remembering intention while the character of the intervening period affects it only indirectly via perseveration.

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