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Levels of processing: A reply to Lockhart and Craik
Author(s) -
Eysenck Michael W.
Publication year - 1978
Publication title -
british journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.536
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 2044-8295
pISSN - 0007-1269
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1978.tb01645.x
Subject(s) - falsifiability , statement (logic) , repetition (rhetorical device) , reading (process) , psychology , trace (psycholinguistics) , perception , cognitive psychology , product (mathematics) , epistemology , cognitive science , linguistics , philosophy , mathematics , geometry , neuroscience
Lockhart & Craik (1978) argue that they have proposed a framework for the study of memory rather than a testable theory, and thus they cannot be proved wrong. In addition, they claim that understanding is at present preferable to prediction. My reactions to this ex cathedra statement are mixed. My reading of the Craik‐Lockhart formulation was that some of the statements in it were potentially falsifiable and others were not. The general notion that the memory trace should be regarded as the product of cognitive‐perceptual operations is probably not directly susceptible to empirical test. However, the hypothesis that Type I processing (i.e. repetition of analyses already carried out) should not enhance memory performance could be, and has been, tested. It is probably true that psychologists attach undue importance to theories making predictions that are consistently confirmed, even if the predictions are utterly trivial. It is worth remembering that it was well known at the time that Newton published his Principia that his theory could not even explain the motion of the moon. Nevertheless, the enhanced understanding produced by Newtonian theory ensured its continued acceptance.