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The progress of psychology
Author(s) -
Farrell B. A.
Publication year - 1978
Publication title -
british journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.536
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 2044-8295
pISSN - 0007-1269
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1978.tb01626.x
Subject(s) - skepticism , psychology , presupposition , imitation , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , psychology of science , subject (documents) , cognitive science , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy , biochemistry , chemistry , library science , computer science
Koch has argued that psychology is an imitation science, because it has failed to build an edifice of positive knowledge; and that it cannot logically do any better in the future. The paper rejects this sceptical argument. The sceptics appear to be victims of the accumulation‐cumbuilding picture of scientific progress, and prisoners of the mistaken presupposition that progress in science consists in either the achievement of a paradigm, or the subsequent development of one. The paper points to weaknesses in the thesis that it is not logically possible for psychology to do any better in the future and achieve a paradigmatic advance. But though the sceptics' case against psychology is a bad one, their case against a traditional view about the nature of psychology is sound; and this suggests that we should think in a different way about the subject.