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THE CONTRADICTION OF EPIPHENOMENALISM: A RESPONSE TO E. A. LOCKE
Author(s) -
NORTON W. A.
Publication year - 1967
Publication title -
british journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.536
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 2044-8295
pISSN - 0007-1269
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1967.tb01101.x
Subject(s) - contradiction , psychology , consciousness , criticism , epistemology , doctrine , perspective (graphical) , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , psychoanalysis , law , biochemistry , chemistry , theology , artificial intelligence , political science , computer science
In the past two years there have been contributions to this journal by Keehn (1964) and Burt (1964) on the topic of consciousness and behaviourism. In a further related paper, Locke (1966) has pointed out the logical difficulty inherent in any attempt to maintain the truth of epiphenomenalism, in so far as a behaviourist, for example, might be described as believing this doctrine and, at the same time, concerned with establishing its truth. The argument appears to the present writer to be somewhat contrived. It may be that there are other grounds on which behaviourism is open to criticism as a would‐be exclusive movement in psychology than simply the apparent contradiction of epiphenomenalism as examined from the perspective of those who hold other views about consciousness.