THE LIMITS OF GENETIC AND OF COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY 1

Synopsis. The distinction between these two branches of Psychology. Genetic Psychology, incompatible with the Humian position, presupposes as its ‘unit’ the conscious self. This involves distinguishing psychical development from biological. Individual and social factors of developing consciousness. The initial problem of Comparative Psychology is to determine the criterion of consciousness. The ‘continuity theory’ maintains that life implies consciousness; the ‘mechanistic theory’ denies consciousness in organisms whose actions are unvaried reflexes. So far as they differ neither theory proves its own thesis or refutes that of its opponent: both agree in recognising consciousness where there are adapted reactions. A survey of the relevant facts known shows that the scope of comparative psychology is after all as wide as animal life. The problem of the nature of animal consciousness at different stages: in the minimal form of consciousness clearly ascertained, where truth and error generate the habit of purposeful reaction, imagination is implied. But even the higher animals seem only to react to concrete situations which they very imperfectly analyse. The question how far there is a social factor in animal development can only be settled when we have an objective test of true imitation. Child psychology: the comparative method alone applicable to infancy: later the child's own introspection may supplement the study of its thoughts, imitations, and self‐assertiveness.