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Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement
Author(s) -
Schafer Karl
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00140.x
Subject(s) - relativism , skepticism , epistemology , moral relativism , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , economic justice , moral psychology , order (exchange) , economics , law , political science , chemistry , biochemistry , finance
I consider sophisticated forms of relativism and their effectiveness at responding to the skeptical argument from moral disagreement. In order to do so, I argue that the relativist must do justice to our intuitions about the depth of moral disagreement, while also explaining why it can be rational to be relatively insensitive to such disagreements. I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability of the resulting account.