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THE SELVES AND THE SHOEMAKER: PSYCHOPATHS, MORAL JUDGMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY
Author(s) -
FINLAY STEPHEN
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00061.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , perspective (graphical) , moral responsibility , moral dilemma , dilemma , psychology , interpretation (philosophy) , criminal responsibility , moral psychology , epistemology , moral reasoning , moral disengagement , social psychology , philosophy , criminology , criminal law , biochemistry , chemistry , linguistics , artificial intelligence , computer science
David Shoemaker argues from (a) psychopaths' emotional deficiency, to (b) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (c) their lack of moral responsibility. This response observes three important ambiguities in his argument, involving the interpretation of (1) psychopaths' emotional deficit, (2) their insensitivity to reasons, and (3) their moral judgments. Resolving these ambiguities presents Shoemaker with a dilemma: his argument either equivocates or it is falsified by the empirical evidence. I then propose an alternative perspective on psychopaths' moral and criminal responsibility.