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Objective Reasons
Author(s) -
Pendlebury Michael
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00064.x
Subject(s) - consistency (knowledge bases) , set (abstract data type) , coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) , order (exchange) , law and economics , computer science , mathematics , economics , statistics , artificial intelligence , finance , programming language
Abstract In order to establish that judgments about practical reasons can be objective, it is necessary to show that the applicable standards provide an adequate account of truth and error. This in turn requires that these standards yield an extensive set of substantive, publicly accessible judgments that are presumptively true. This output requirement is not satisfied by the standards of universalizability, consistency, coherence, and caution alone. But it is satisfied if we supplement them with the principle that desire is a source of minimal reasons. This principle is justified despite currently fashionable arguments against the claims of desire.