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Intellection and Divine Causation in Aristotle
Author(s) -
Côté Antoine
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2005.tb01941.x
Subject(s) - causation , citation , philosophy , classics , art history , humanities , history , library science , computer science , epistemology
Since in every class of objects, just as in the whole of nature, there is something which is their matter, i.e., which is potentially all the individuals, and something else which is their cause or agent (aition kai poiētikon) in that it makes them all—the two things being related as an art to its material—these distinct elements must be present in the soul also. Mind in the passive sense (ho toioutos nous) is such because it becomes all things, but mind has another aspect in that it makes all things (panta poiein); this is a kind of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours. Mind in this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially an activity; for the agent is always superior to the patient, and the originating cause to the matter. (...)When isolated (chōristheis) it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (...) and without this nothing thinks. [De anima, III, 5, 430 a 10-25, tr. Hett].