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Non‐Cognitivism and Inconsistency
Author(s) -
Tersman Folke
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00750.x
Subject(s) - utilitarianism , philosophy , coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) , cognitivism (psychology) , reflective equilibrium , epistemology , sociology , psychology , mathematics , cognition , statistics , neuroscience
A popular objection to ethical noncognitivism is that it fails to account for the realist appearance of moral discourse. This paper focuses on one feature of this appearance: Our tendency to seek consistency among our moral views. Contrary to what has been argued, I hold that noncognitivists can rationalize this practice. In support of this position, I mention some considerations indicating why, on a noncognitivist view, it is reasonable to seek moral consistency. However, I also discuss how well the main competitor to noncognitivism (that is, moral realism) fares in rendering this practice reasonable.