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ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES AND RESPONSIBILITY
Author(s) -
O'Connor Timothy
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1993.tb01726.x
Subject(s) - metaphysics , citation , philosophy , philosophy of science , o'connor , sociology , epistemology , library science , theology , computer science
Harry Frankfurt has dubbed the first of these claims "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities" (PAP). Though this principle is widely accepted, Frankfurt1 has brought to light a range of cases that (to many) appear to provide grounds for rejecting it. One of his well-known examples concerns a man named Black who wants Jones to perform a certain action: [Black] waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do.