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FEINBERG ON WHAT SORTS OF BEINGS CAN HAVE RIGHTS 1
Author(s) -
Regan Tom
Publication year - 1976
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1976.tb01304.x
Subject(s) - value (mathematics) , state (computer science) , citation , philosophy , classics , law , history , political science , computer science , algorithm , machine learning
Feinberg refers to the principle expressed in (1) and implied by (2) as “the interest pr in~iple .”~ His view is that a logically necessary and sufficient condition for a being’s possibly possessing rights is that it meet this principle. I shall have more to say about the interest principle in what follows. First, though, we need to realize that there is another principle concerning the sorts of beings which can possess rights that is implied by other things Feinberg says but to which he gives no name. This can be made clear by considering these additional claims: have (or can have) interests” (p. 51).