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Sales Maximization or Profit Maximization? How State Shareholders Discipline their CEOs in China *
Author(s) -
Opper Sonja,
Wong Sonia,
Yang Yong
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
asia‐pacific journal of financial studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.375
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 2041-6156
pISSN - 2041-9945
DOI - 10.1111/j.2041-6156.2012.01076.x
Subject(s) - profitability index , shareholder , business , chief executive officer , china , accounting , profit maximization , maximization , profit (economics) , marketing , industrial organization , finance , corporate governance , economics , microeconomics , management , political science , law
This study examines the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover in Chinese state‐owned firms. Based on a sample of 1 555 turnover cases among listed firms in China during the period 1999–2003, we obtain three main results. First, CEO turnover is negatively related to the sales performance but not the profitability of the core business. Second, the negative relationship between CEO turnover and sales is stronger for firms with excessive employment and higher organizational slack. Third, there is a significant post‐turnover increase in sales but a decline in profitability of the core business. Overall, our evidence suggests that state shareholders put a greater emphasis on sales generation than on profitability when they monitor their CEOs.