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Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Democratic Countries: The Case of South Korea and the USA *
Author(s) -
Shin Youseop
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
pacific focus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1976-5118
pISSN - 1225-4657
DOI - 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2012.01079.x
Subject(s) - legislature , democracy , worry , political science , public administration , intelligence analysis , public relations , law , psychology , politics , anxiety , psychiatry
Public worry about the potential for human rights abuse in the name of gathering intelligence can significantly reduce when the legislative branch successfully carries out control over intelligence agencies. This article analyzes the legislative oversight of intelligence agencies in South Korea, comparing it with intelligence oversight in the USA. Various factors related to intelligence committee characteristics and legislators' behavior can reduce the effectiveness of intelligence oversight, and their deleterious effect can be more serious in Korea than in the USA. To reduce any deleterious effect of these problems, especially in emerging democratic countries, such as South Korea, this article makes several suggestions.