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“Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defense of Australia
Author(s) -
Tanter Richard
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
pacific focus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1976-5118
pISSN - 1225-4657
DOI - 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01058.x
Subject(s) - deterrence theory , certainty , nuclear weapon , deterrence (psychology) , law and economics , nuclear ethics , political science , business , economics , law , epistemology , philosophy
This paper examines the foundations and rationale for Australian reliance on US assurances of extended nuclear deterrence. The Australian model of extended nuclear deterrence is marked by its lack of public presence, a lack of certainty about its standing and character in US eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear threat, and its resurgence at a time when nuclear abolition possibilities are being embraced by the leader of the deterrence provider. Australian policy amounts to a claim that the nuclear guarantee is necessary “just in case”– though without any plausible specifics. The fundamental questions remain – for Australia as for other recipients of extended nuclear deterrence assurances – what threats, what probabilities, what alternatives?