Premium
China's Grand Strategy, the Korean Nuclear Crisis, and the Six‐Party Talks
Author(s) -
Horowitz Shale,
Ye Min
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
pacific focus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1976-5118
pISSN - 1225-4657
DOI - 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2006.tb00320.x
Subject(s) - china , political science , nuclear weapon , grand strategy , legitimacy , foreign policy , politics , political economy , international trade , development economics , law , business , sociology , economics
North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons capability for about two decades. Many diplomatic efforts have been made to convince or cajole the Northern regime to give up this quest – and all have so far failed. Since 2003, a new multilateral approach – the Six‐Party Talks involving the Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States – has raised hopes anew. These hopes are based largely on China playing an active role. China has the potential both to guarantee North Korea's security, and to impose and enforce a denuclearization agreement. We analyze China's changing grand strategy and its implications for China's Korea goals and policies. To Deng Xiaoping's emphasis on China's national interests, China's third‐ and fourth‐generation leaders have added a greater reliance on foreign and military policies to maintain domestic political support and legitimacy. This discussion indicates that China is currently more concerned to preserve the North Korean regime and prevent a second Korean War than to eliminate the North's nuclear capability. Therefore, the Six‐Party Talks are unlikely to succeed.