How Can the United States Take the Initiative in the Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis?

On September 19, 2005, the last day of the fourth round of six‐party talks, a deal was announced in which North Korea pledged to end its nuclear program in return for a number of concessions. Within 24 hours of that announcement, North Korea clarified its position by stating that the United States “should not even dream” it would dismantle its nuclear weapons until it receives a light‐water nuclear reactor. Despite four rounds of six‐party talks over a three year period, it seems that almost no real progress has been made, except for North Korea; US intelligence officials estimate that North Korea could have made as many as 8 or 9 nuclear weapons already. So it seems North Korea has cleverly increased its bargaining position vis‐à‐vis the United States. As lengthy negotiations over the provision of a Light Water Reactor (LWR) will undoubtedly ensue, it can use that time to steadily increase its nuclear deterrent. Why did the United States agree to this sub‐optimal outcome? Why was it so difficult for the United States to exert more influence on North Korea and the other countries in the six‐party talks? The answer to these questions lies in the changing trends affecting Northeast Asian security dynamics. For various reasons that this article will explain, these trends affect the ability of the United States to take the initiative in the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. As long as the United States fails to account for various changes in Northeast Asian regional dynamics, its strategy will to deter North Korea from continuing its nuclear program will not succeed.