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Negotiations and the Anti‐Taliban Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
Author(s) -
Abbas Zaidi Syed Manzar
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
asian politics and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.193
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1943-0787
pISSN - 1943-0779
DOI - 10.1111/j.1943-0787.2010.01187.x
Subject(s) - insurgency , negotiation , human settlement , government (linguistics) , element (criminal law) , political science , political economy , law , sociology , criminology , politics , history , philosophy , linguistics , archaeology
This article engages with the Pakistani government's tendency to negotiate peace settlements with Taliban militants as a primary element of their counterinsurgency (COIN) policy. These peace settlements have consistently broken down, exacerbating a causal spiral of violence, as elaborated by an analytical matrix by the author. This COIN strategy has been seen by many, particularly in the United States, as a beacon for militants to regroup, with a consequent renewal of insurgency and terror attacks. This article attempts to contextualize the peace processes reached by negotiations of the Pakistani government with the militants, with projections for a successful COIN policy being articulated at the empirical level.