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Rattling the Hesam : International Distractions from Internal Problems in Iran
Author(s) -
Tures John A.
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
asian politics and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.193
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1943-0787
pISSN - 1943-0779
DOI - 10.1111/j.1943-0787.2009.01102.x
Subject(s) - ideology , prestige , politics , power (physics) , criticism , rhetoric , foreign policy , political science , political economy , context (archaeology) , law , sociology , history , philosophy , theology , linguistics , physics , archaeology , quantum mechanics
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad began waging a war of words against the state of Israel several months after he won Iran's 2005 election. This article explores the motives for his fiery rhetoric. A series of explanations including ideological zeal, inexperience, international pressure, unifying regional regimes, and inciting a war with Israel are evaluated and critiqued. This article offers a new rationale that examines internal politics as a motive for the Iranian leader's speeches. The diversionary theory of conflict, which claims that leaders try to overcome domestic shortcomings with foreign distractions, is examined in this context. But while this theory has typically been associated with war and unifying the country's political structure, this article contends that President Ahmadinejad's plan may not be full‐scale war, but a verbal confrontation and subtle support for terror groups, which can be just as effective in achieving internal aims. Such a policy would also win converts among the rank‐and‐file Arabs. The resulting regional prestige is also designed to mask his domestic shortcomings in the political and economic arena. Blasting Israel and boosting groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, while receiving cheers from many Arab people for standing up to Israel, in other words, is designed to distract the Iranian people from the sinking economy and President Ahmadinejad's loss of power, blocked appointments, and criticism from even conservatives. In addition, rather than seeking support from the entire country, the president may be trying to outflank his conservative opponents, including many from the clergy, legislature, and ruling elite, who have become disenchanted with his anti‐corruption crusades, appointments, and policies. If successful, this plan would pit his country's conservative majority (including young people and the Revolutionary Guard) against the minority moderates and some disaffected conservatives. Finally, this article critiques other theories and suggested strategies responding to the crisis and offers its own diversionary theory, as well as ideas about how to handle President Ahmadinejad's oratories.