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Superfluous or Mischievous: Evaluating the Determinants of Government Defeats in Second Chambers
Author(s) -
FISK DAVID
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00012.x
Subject(s) - veto , opposition (politics) , legislation , incentive , government (linguistics) , balance (ability) , law and economics , economics , function (biology) , incentive compatibility , position (finance) , public economics , law , political science , microeconomics , politics , finance , psychology , linguistics , philosophy , neuroscience , evolutionary biology , biology
Governments often extol the policy refining functions of second chambers, but in bicameral parliamentary systems, governments must balance these policy refinement functions with their ability to pass legislation in the second chamber. I examine government defeats in the second chamber, suggesting they are a function of the cost and the likelihood of defeat. Using an original dataset, I find that strong veto authority creates incentives for governments to act strategically to avoid defeats (even when facing a friendly chamber), while opposition majorities and a weaker ability to sanction members who deviate from their party's position increase the likelihood of defeat.