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Balancing Competing Demands: Position Taking and Election Proximity in the European Parliament
Author(s) -
LINDSTÄDT RENÉ,
SLAPIN JONATHAN B.,
VANDER WIELEN RYAN J.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00003.x
Subject(s) - parliament , cohesion (chemistry) , political science , legislature , ideology , political economy , incentive , position (finance) , public administration , law , politics , economics , market economy , chemistry , organic chemistry , finance
Parties value unity, yet members of parliament have incentives to deviate from the party line. This article examines how members of the European Parliament (EP) respond to competing demands from national parties and European party groups. We examine ideological shifts within a single parliamentary term to assess how election proximity affects party group cohesion. Our formal model of legislative behavior suggests that when EP elections are proximate, national party delegations shift toward national party positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. Our Bayesian item‐response analysis of roll calls in the 5th EP supports our theoretical predictions.