Open AccessINTERTEMPORAL INVESTMENTS INTO SYNFUELS
Author(s) -
WIRL FRANZ
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
natural resource modeling
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.28
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1939-7445
pISSN - 0890-8575
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2008.00020.x
Subject(s) - cartel , economics , subgame perfect equilibrium , agency (philosophy) , fossil fuel , microeconomics , collusion , game theory , engineering , philosophy , epistemology , waste management
This paper considers the interactions of consumers demanding energy services provided by fossil fuels delivered by a cartel and a synfuel industry (competitive, cartelized or run by a consumer cartel, say International Energy Agency [IEA]). The emphasis of this paper is to account for the necessarily sluggish build up capacities instead of the instantaneous unconstrained availability assumed in the backstop literature and to investigate intertemporal and subgame perfect equilibria (in Markov strategies).