Open AccessAN INTERNATIONAL MARINE POLLUTANT SINK IN AN ASYMMETRIC ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY GAME
Author(s) -
HENNLOCK MAGNUS
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
natural resource modeling
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.28
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1939-7445
pISSN - 0890-8575
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2008.00008.x
Subject(s) - differential game , nash equilibrium , enforcement , economics , consumption (sociology) , sink (geography) , natural resource economics , sequential game , investment (military) , environmental economics , pareto principle , game theory , pollutant , pareto optimal , microeconomics , computer science , multi objective optimization , ecology , mathematical optimization , operations management , social science , mathematics , cartography , machine learning , sociology , politics , political science , law , biology , geography
A differential game with N countries as players is developed for the analysis of a marine resource with open access used by the countries as a pollutant sink and for production of an ecosystem good. Consumption, investment, abatement, and environmental research sectors may differ across countries. Under the assumption that property rights are well defined within the sovereignty of each country although there is a lack of enforcement in the international area, the game is solved for the feedback Nash equilibrium, using the Isaacs–Bellman dynamic programming technique, identifying the nonlinear feedback Nash flows of consumption, investment, harvest effort, abatement, and environmental research effort in each country, which is then compared to the Pareto optimal global solution.