Open AccessPARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
Author(s) -
FINUS MICHAEL,
RUNDSHAGEN BIANCA
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
natural resource modeling
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.28
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1939-7445
pISSN - 0890-8575
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2006.tb00179.x
Subject(s) - enforcement , moderation , environmental regulation , process (computing) , pareto principle , business , welfare , strategic interaction , international economics , international trade , economics , public economics , microeconomics , ecology , computer science , operations management , market economy , machine learning , biology , operating system
. We analyze the formation of self‐enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto‐improving to all parties.