Open AccessSEQUENTIAL FISHING: COOPERATIVE AND NON‐COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA
Author(s) -
Hannesson Röugnvaldur
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
natural resource modeling
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.28
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1939-7445
pISSN - 0890-8575
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.1995.tb00296.x
Subject(s) - stock (firearms) , fishing , time horizon , economics , mathematical economics , computer science , mathematics , fishery , mathematical optimization , biology , mechanical engineering , engineering
Two agents control the areas in which a migrating fish stock is located. The harvesting is sequential. The stock available to Agent 1 depends on the growth of the stock, which in turn depends on the amount left after harvesting by Agent 2. The stock available to Agent 2 is the quantity left after harvesting by Agent 1. Each agent fishes down the stock in each period to an “abandonment level” deemed appropriate. The problem is analyzed as a noncooperative versus cooperative, repeated game with an infinite time horizon. In the noncooperative solution, both agents will harvest the stock if the unit cost of Agent 2 is not too much higher than the unit cost of Agent 1. A cooperative solution supported by a threat to revert to the noncooperative solution if deviation occurs implies greater differences in unit costs at which both agents will harvest the stock. The problem is illustrated by a simple, numerical example.