Open AccessREGULATORY CONTROLS AND MARKET POWER EXERTION: A STUDY OF THE PACIFIC HALIBUT INDUSTRY
Author(s) -
Love H. Alan,
Burton Diana M.,
Sylvia Gilbert,
Lei Shangli
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
natural resource modeling
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.28
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1939-7445
pISSN - 0890-8575
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.1995.tb00200.x
Subject(s) - halibut , monopsony , economic rent , market power , business , power (physics) , exertion , industrial organization , fishery , economics , market economy , microeconomics , medicine , biology , fish <actinopterygii> , monopoly , physics , quantum mechanics
Regulatory controls designed to manage Pacific halibut fisheries are shown to have altered firms' competitive behavior. Managing catch through open access derbies allowed processors to exert monopsony market power at the vessel level during short seasons. As a result, a significant portion of regulatory rents associated with reduced seasons were captured by processors. Results also indicate that processors have not exerted significant market power at the wholesale level.