Open Access“STRAGEDY” OF THE COMMONS
Author(s) -
Negri Donald H.
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
natural resource modeling
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.28
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1939-7445
pISSN - 0890-8575
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.1990.tb00222.x
Subject(s) - subgame perfect equilibrium , commons , mathematical economics , inefficiency , economics , subgame , nash equilibrium , externality , common pool resource , microeconomics , best response , epsilon equilibrium , ecology , biology
This paper computes open loop and subgame perfect Nash equilibria for an infinite horizon, common property resource model with congestion and stock externalities. The model permits the comparison of the game‐theoretic approach and the traditional commons literature, which preceded the widespread recognition of the games, because the underlying assumptions are equivalent. With access to the commons restricted, the subgame perfect equilibrium captures the inefficiency associated with the strategic scramble to capture the resource reserves the open loop does not. Under sole ownership, the two equilibrium concepts coincide with the surplus maximizing extraction policy. In free access, the extraction strategies under both equilibrium concepts coincide with complete rent dissipation.