Open AccessCOASTAL STATES, DISTANT WATER FISHING NATIONS AND EXTENDED JURISDICTION: A PRINCIPAL–AGENT ANALYSIS
Author(s) -
Clarke F.H.,
Munro G.R.
Publication year - 1987
Publication title -
natural resource modeling
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.28
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1939-7445
pISSN - 0890-8575
DOI - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.1987.tb00027.x
Subject(s) - jurisdiction , principal (computer security) , fishing , incentive , state (computer science) , exclusive economic zone , maritime boundary , business , environmental resource management , natural resource economics , law , political science , economics , computer science , international law , microeconomics , computer security , algorithm
This paper is concerned with the issue of optimal economic arrangements between coastal states and distant water fishing nations under Extended Jurisdiction. It is argued that the issue is appropriately examined within the framework of principal‐agent analysis. The coastal state, having property rights to the relevent fishery resources, is seen as the principal; the distant water fishing nation (s) is (are) seen as the agent(s). Circumstances under which it will, and will not, be possible for the coastal state to establish incentive schemes that will allow it to achieve first best situations are analysed.