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Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed *
Author(s) -
PÉREZ OTERO MANUEL
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00613.x
Subject(s) - externalism , internalism and externalism , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , inference , rationality , content (measure theory) , philosophy of mind , contemporary philosophy , metaphysics , mathematics , mathematical analysis , chemistry , biochemistry
I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality (to use his term). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. In that sense, insofar as Boghossian’s scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen (against Boghossian’s original intention) as providing additional evidence for content externalism.