Mitigating Soft Compatibilism

Let compatibilism name the thesis that determinism is compatible with free action and moral responsibility. 1 Compatibilists are united by their belief that determinism does not preclude moral responsibility or free action. They are divided, however, on whether the truth of determinism is nevertheless somehow relevant to moral responsibility. Two main positions on the issue have emerged. There are those who say that the truth of determinism is relevant because it is required for moral responsibility, and those who deny this and who insist instead that the truth of determinism is entirely irrelevant to the issue of responsibility. Most compatibilists fall into one or the other of these two camps. But a third position is available that, with one exception to be discussed towards the end of the paper, has yet to be seriously explored by compatibilists and their opponents, according to which determinism mitigates (without necessarily eliminating) responsibility. 2 My principal aim in what follows is to explicate this novel brand of compatibilism and to highlight the unique resources it possesses for dealing with a popular and forceful style of argument against compatibilism. I also discuss one of the most pressing challenges facing a compatibilist view of this sort, and offer some