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Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface
Author(s) -
Kaplan Mark
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00563.x
Subject(s) - citation , lottery , publishing , philosophy , analytic philosophy , epistemology , classics , computer science , history , library science , contemporary philosophy , mathematics , art , literature , statistics
Imagine that I have just finished delivering a philosophy paper. The question period has just begun. You raise your hand. Once called upon, you tell me that something I said very early on in my presentation, taken together with two things I said somewhat late in the presentation, logically imply a contradiction. What might I say in response? I might say that I actually hadn’t said all these three things. Or, I might deny that the three things logically imply a contradiction. What I wouldn’t do—because it would be absolutely outrageous for me to do it—is admit that I said the three things, admit that they logically imply a contradiction, but deny that this was any criticism of what I said. Thus the following principle: