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Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
Author(s) -
Brössel Peter,
Eder AnnaMaria A.,
Huber Franz
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00543.x
Subject(s) - community of inquiry , rationality , epistemology , philosophy , philosophy of science , sociology , psychology , cognition , neuroscience
Kelly holds that epistemic rationality cannot be understood as a form of instrumental rationality, because an agent may lack the relevant cognitive goal while still being epistemically rational. Suppose an agent does not have the cognitive goal of believing the truth or has other, overriding goals. In this case it is not necessarily instrumentally rational for her to believe a certain proposition even if the latter is strongly supported by her evidence, and thus, on Kelly’s view, a proposition which it would be epistemically rational for her to believe.