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Is Evidence Knowledge?
Author(s) -
COMESAÑA JUAN,
KANTIN HOLLY
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00323.x
Subject(s) - citation , library science , computer science
In chapter 9 of Knowledge and its Limits (Williamson 2000), Timothy Williamson argues for the thesis that the evidence that a subject has is constituted by propositions known by the subject (a thesis that he summarizes in the equation E=K). Moreover, Williamson also argues that whatever justifies a subject in believing a proposition is part of that subject’s evidence, and thus that only propositions that a subject knows can justify further propositions. We will argue that such a position has two implausible consequences. First, it is incompatible with the existence of Gettier cases. Second, it entails that a plausible principle of the closure of justification fails. But there are Gettier cases, and the closure principle is true. Therefore, evidence isn’t knowledge.

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