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Tense, Timely Action and Self‐Ascription
Author(s) -
TORRE STEPHAN
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00312.x
Subject(s) - ascription , action (physics) , subject (documents) , psychology , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , causal theory of reference , philosophy , computer science , biochemistry , physics , chemistry , quantum mechanics , library science
I consider whether the self‐ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B‐theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self‐ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A‐theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the self‐ascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of self‐ascription to be a momentary person‐stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations of the self‐ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self‐ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self‐ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self‐ascription to be a momentary person‐stage or an enduring person, the self‐ascription theory provides a plausible B‐theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible.