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Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism
Author(s) -
LYNCH MICHAEL P.
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00267.x
Subject(s) - expressivism , philosophy , value (mathematics) , skepticism , epistemology , duty , theology , computer science , machine learning
A familiar view in ethical theory is that ethical c laims do not literally describe the world; they do not – in at least one s ense – state facts. Rather, they express our sentiments, or emotional attitudes , or convey our moral stances and commitments. Variations on this view ar e now legion. 1 I’ll call this general family of views expressivism. Expressivism, isn’t confined to ethics. One might a dopt it towards any type of value and claims about that value. 2 In this paper, I want to examine whether we can adopt it towards the value of truth. I s all argue that we lack any standpoint from which we can make expressi vism about the value of truth intelligible. This turns out to tell us so mething important both about truth and about value.