Premium
Can ‘Intrinsic’ Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions? 1
Author(s) -
MARSHALL DAN
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x
Subject(s) - mereology , property (philosophy) , modal , epistemology , virtue , philosophy , possible world , logical consequence , analytic philosophy , contemporary philosophy , chemistry , polymer chemistry
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.