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Locke’s Problem Concerning Perceptual Error
Author(s) -
LOLORDO ANTONIA
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00216.x
Subject(s) - perception , philosophy of mind , psychology , philosophy , cognitive science , epistemology , cognitive psychology , metaphysics
For perceptions of shape can falsely represent their objects. Consider a time-honoured example: when I look at a square tower from far away, it looks round. Thus, on a theory that holds that perception is a matter of having ideas, I have a false idea of the shape of the tower. Locke does not explicitly endorse this claim. Indeed, as has frequently been noted,1 his Essay Concerning Human Understanding2 contains surprisingly little discussion of perceptual error. However, given how obvious perceptual error is in everyday life, and given that Locke never denies that there is perceptual error, it is prima facie reasonable to assume that Locke recognizes its existence. Conjoining (1) with two other theses for which the Essay provides significant textual evidence and which are almost universally attributed to Locke raises a problem. For the triad consisting of (1) and the following two theses is inconsistent: