Preçis of The Evolution of Morality

The Evolution of Morality attempts to accomplish two tasks. The first is to clarify and provisionally advocate the thesis that human morality is a distinct adaptation wrought by biological natural selection. The second is to inquire whether this empirical thesis would, if true, have any metaethical implications. Before the hypothesis that human morality is innate can be fruitfully investigated we must understand its content. In this context, in claiming that X is innate I mean that the present-day existence of the trait is to be explained by reference to a genotype having granted ancestors reproductive advantage, rather than by reference to psychological processes of acquisition. In claiming that human morality is innate, I do not mean that humans are innately social, or innately nice and friendly, or even that we innately have emotions that favor social cohesion; rather, I mean that humans have an innate tendency to make moral judgments. Thus, an evolutionary explanation of, say, human altruism (whether in a psychological or an evolutionary sense) or sympathy would not count as an evolutionary explanation of human morality. Having an inhibition against cheating one's fellows is to be distinguished from judging that cheating is prohibited. Although making a moral judgment is a different phenomenon from being helpful, it is, nevertheless, natural to assume that the former typically works in the service of the latter: that the capacity to engage in moral judgment enhances in some manner a creature's social tendencies. This poses a prima facie puzzle for moral nativism, since, it would seem on the face of it, natural selection is a competitive race where the laurels always go to the self-serving egoist. Chapter 1 undertakes the task of combating this assumption, by outlining four processes whereby natural selection may favor traits of helpfulness: kin selection,