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A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content
Author(s) -
ROSKIES ADINA L.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00160.x
Subject(s) - conceptualism , argument (complex analysis) , psychological nativism , epistemology , naturalism , content (measure theory) , philosophy of mind , perception , philosophy , cognitive science , psychology , metaphysics , mathematics , mathematical analysis , chemistry , biochemistry , archaeology , immigration , history
This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of nativism that results is incompatible with naturalistic accounts of concept learning. This cost can be avoided, and concept learning accounted for if nonconceptual content of experience is admitted.