Anti‐intellectualism and the Knowledge‐Action Principle

How does Stanley argue for this remarkable thesis? Stanley’s case for anti-intellectualism may appear to be an argument to the best explanation of our intuitions concerning five cases, which he calls ‘‘High Stakes,’’ ‘‘Low Stakes,’’ ‘‘Ignorant High Stakes,’’ ‘‘Low AttributorHigh Stakes,’’ and ‘‘High Attributor-Low Stakes.’’ But if that is his argumentative strategy, then it suffers from a problem: Stanley’s professed intuitions about ‘‘Low Attributor-High Stakes’’ (at least) are not right. More precisely, our intuitions about ‘‘Low Attributor-High Stakes’’ vary, and they vary in a way that Stanley does not explain, but that some contextualists can explain. Furthermore, there is a version of intellectualist contextualism that provides a better explanation of the other four cases, and also of the variation of intuitions about ‘‘Low Attributor-High Stakes.’’ Now, if Stanley’s case for anti-intellectualism were simply an argument to the best explanation of our intuitions concerning these fives cases, then this would indeed be a serious problem for him. But Stanley makes a remark that suggests that this is not his argumentative strategy. He admits that intuitions about the five cases may differ from person to person, but then he goes on to say the following: ‘‘The role of these intuitions is not akin to the role of observational data for a scientific theory. The intuitions are instead intended to reveal the