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Thoughts Without Distinctive Non‐Imagistic Phenomenology
Author(s) -
ROBINSON WILLIAM S.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00414.x
Subject(s) - feeling , phenomenology (philosophy) , epistemology , psychology , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy
Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non‐sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non‐imagistic ‘what it is like’ to think that p , and a different non‐imagistic ‘what it is like’ to think that q. Nor need we suppose that there is a proprietary ‘what it is like’ to have one propositional attitude type rather than another.