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Self‐Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness
Author(s) -
NOORDHOF PAUL
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00026.x
Subject(s) - deception , interpretation (philosophy) , self deception , consciousness , judgement , epistemology , psychology , philosophy of mind , subject (documents) , face (sociological concept) , extant taxon , counterexample , philosophy , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , social psychology , computer science , metaphysics , mathematics , linguistics , discrete mathematics , evolutionary biology , library science , biology
I argue that the extant theories of self‐deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self‐deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of total evidence—are given a weight in attentive consciousness which does not correspond to our reflective judgement of their weight. Successful interpretation does not involve ascribing beliefs and desires by reference to what a subject ought to believe and desire, contrary to what Interpretists suggest.