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Quasi‐realism and Relativism
Author(s) -
Moore A. W.
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00190.x
Subject(s) - relativism , realism , citation , philosophy , epistemology , computer science , library science
1. If it is true that 'an ethic is the propositional reflection of the dispositions and attitudes, policies and stances, of people,' as Simon Blackburn says in summary of the quasi-realism that he champions in this excellent and wonder- fully provocative book (p. 310), then it seems to follow that different dispo- sitions, attitudes, policies and stances-different conative stares, for short-will issue in different ethics, each with an equal claim to truth; and this in turn seems to be one thing that could be reasonably meant by that slippery polyseme 'relativism'. If such relativism does follow, a good deal remains to be said about how much force it has. At the limit it might do no more than signal the abstract possibility of an ethic rivalling that of humans. More potently, it might somehow legitimize the different ethics of different groups of humans in actual conflict with one another. But without the possi- bility of some such variability of ethic to match a possible variability of conative state, the quasi-realist's claim that an ethic 'reflects' a particular combination of conative states appears hollow. In the splendid final chapter of his book, and again in the appendix, Blackburn nevertheless tries to keep relativism at bay. Carefully distinguish- ing some of the many different things that 'relativism' can mean, he argues, with respect to each, either that he is not committed to it or that it does noth- ing to imply that our own ethic is in any interesting sense 'just' ours. But I want to suggest that Blackburn is committed to a form of relativism whereby our own ethic indeed is in some interesting sense 'just' ours (for some inter- esting value of 'we'). The relativism in question is not the view that, had our conative states been different, different ethical standards might have applied; Blackburn has persistently and persuasively argued that he is not committed to anything like that. Nor is it the view that, had our conative states been different, we might have applied different ethical standards; that is a platitude (and scarcely merits the label 'relativism'). The view is something lying subtly between these, namely that, had our conative states been different, we might have applied different ethical standards and it might have been right for us to do so; we